And there we have it – Orbán is out. After 16 years of controlling virtually every lever of Hungarian politics, he is moving into the opposition. It is a remarkable fall for a leader who didn’t just govern Hungary, but fundamentally reshaped it – and not in a good way, write Dr Helena Ivanov, associate fellow, The Henry Jackson Society and Mykola Kuzmin, policy manager, Henry Jackson Society.
Those 16 years were defined by serious democratic backsliding. Most visibly, this took the form of a systematic dismantling of the free and independent press, alongside sustained pressure on universities and other critical institutions. The cumulative effect is difficult to ignore: by many standards, Orbán’s Hungary today would struggle to qualify for EU membership. His hardline anti-immigration stance was widely criticised as inhumane, while electoral gerrymandering – ironically designed to secure his dominance – ultimately helped create the conditions for his defeat.
At the same time, Hungary’s relationship with the EU steadily deteriorated. Orbán positioned himself as a persistent thorn in the side of collective European policymaking, frequently blocking or delaying key decisions. This was most evident on Ukraine, where he maintained close ties with the Kremlin and obstructed EU efforts to provide meaningful support to Ukraine.
And yet, for all the structural advantages he built, Orbán lost. After years of entrenched corruption, economic pressure, and frozen EU funds, public frustration had been building. But just as importantly, this election produced something Hungary had not seen in years: a credible challenger from within the system, Péter Magyar, a Fidesz veteran who turned on Orban. Finally, Hungarians had someone to vote for.
In the run-up to the election, Orban deployed a very familiar playbook: tight control over the media, relentless fearmongering about Hungary’s future without Orbán, and an unusually visible level of foreign backing. Support came from the Kremlin, from Netanyahu’s coalition, and, strikingly, from the United States, with Vice President J.D. Vance making a last-minute visit urging Hungarians to back Orbán. For a modern European election, this level of external involvement is unprecedented – especially for a leader as controversial as Orbán.
And still, it was not enough. Hungarian voters delivered a decisive verdict. Péter Magyar’s (pictured) landslide victory marks the end of an era – and, potentially, the beginning of something very different.
There is also something almost poetic about it all. When Péter Magyar was a child, he taped a photo of Orbán to his bedroom wall – thrilled, like many Hungarians, by the anti-Communist firebrand leading the country’s first democratic elections in 1990. Thirty-six years later, he has just ended Orbán’s career. It is hard to think of a more fitting image for the arc of Hungarian democracy – promise, capture, and now perhaps, recovery.
It is precisely that sense of a turning point that has driven waves of optimism across Europe. To be sure, Magyar kept relatively quiet on foreign policy during the campaign – partly to avoid giving Orbán easy lines of attack – but he has signalled a clear intention to repair relations with the EU.
Domestically, too, there are reasons for hope. Many Hungarians supported him not necessarily out of deep ideological alignment, but because he appears committed to restoring at least the basic conditions of democratic life. Early signals – such as suspending state news broadcasts until minimum standards of objectivity can be ensured – point in that direction, as does his emphasis on tackling corruption and strengthening accountability.
It is also worth noting what did not happen. Despite years of democratic erosion, Hungary proved more resilient than many expected. There were real concerns about whether Orbán would accept defeat, or what the aftermath might look like. Instead, the transition has, at least so far, been peaceful.
All of this justifies a degree of optimism. Not only because Magyar may offer a different path on both domestic and foreign policy, but also because 16 years is simply too long for any leader in a functioning democracy. The very fact that change remained possible – despite deeply uneven electoral conditions – matters. More broadly, Orbán’s defeat will be read across Europe as a test case: whether entrenched illiberal systems can still be challenged through the ballot box. Just next door in Serbia, Hungary’s outcome is already being watched closely. The student movement – currently leading a mass uprising against President Vučić, one of Orbán’s closest allies – is beginning to see in it a possible precedent, a sign that a similar political shift might not be out of reach there either.
But optimism should not slide into naivety. There are real reasons for caution – particularly from an EU perspective. Magyar is, after all, a Fidesz veteran, which raises legitimate questions about how different his leadership will be in practice. His campaign focused overwhelmingly on internal issues, leaving considerable uncertainty about how far any domestic changes will translate into foreign policy shifts.
And where he has spoken, the picture is mixed. Magyar has made clear that Hungary will continue purchasing Russian energy and prioritising access to cheap oil – positions that sit uneasily alongside his broader pro-European messaging. Churchill’s warning comes to mind: given the choice between war and dishonour, those who choose dishonour tend to get both. Hungary cannot keep buying Russian energy and expect the geopolitical bill never to arrive. Germany spent a decade learning this lesson through Nord Stream, and is still paying for it.
For Magyar to campaign as a pro-European reformer while preserving precisely the economic dependency that made Orbán useful to the Kremlin is, at best, a contradiction; and at worst, the same hook in a new mouth.
Likewise, while he has indicated he will not block EU financial support for Ukraine, Hungary itself will not contribute.
On migration, he has signalled continuity rather than change, opposing the EU’s migration pact and maintaining the border fence built under Orbán.
All in all, there are good reasons to welcome this moment. An entrenched leader has been voted out, and Hungary has been given a chance to reset. But Orbán’s system will not disappear overnight simply because Orbán himself is gone. This is a simple matter of machinery. Sixteen years of Fidesz rule means 16 years of loyalty-based appointments, across the judiciary, the prosecutor’s office, the central banks, the media council, state enterprises, and the civil service. Hungary’s institutions were not merely bent toward Orbán, they were staffed for him.
Even with a two-thirds majority, unwinding that apparatus is a years-long project, and every step will be framed by a Fidesz opposition still in possession of its media ecosystem, as political persecution. Orbán is gone. Orbánism, however, is not. And that is the real test that lies ahead.
